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Note: Right to Jury Trial Under Section 5(1) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act-Building
"Iron Power" in the Seventh Amendment
Millions of American television viewers have watched Ted
Mack claim that Geritol, a high potency tonic with twice the
iron in a pound of calves' liver, could cure iron deficiency anemia
or tired blood and make consumers feel stronger fast. Recently,
after more than ten years of administrative proceedings before
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Government brought
suit in federal district court against J.B. Williams Company and
Parkson Advertising Agency, alleging that they had falsely rep-
resented that their products, Geritol and FemIron, could relieve
tiredness and build "iron power" in ailing blood cells.1 In United
States v. J.B. Williams Co.,2 the Government was awarded
$812,000 in civil penalties under section 5 (1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,3 but on appeal,4 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding that
the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial under the seventh
amendment. Both the majority opinion of Judge Friendly and
the forceful dissent of Judge Oakesu raised significant issues re-
garding the compatibility of jury trials with effective regulation
by administrative agencies. Prior to Williams, no court had
squarely faced the jury trial issue under section 5 (l). In United
States v. Hindman,6 a district court in the Third Circuit had held
that the defendant had a right to a civil jury trial when there
was a factual dispute over the violation of an FTC cease and
desist order, but the court did not explain its departure from
the long line of cases denying such a right under similar circum-
stances.7 In United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co.,8
1. The controversy began in 1962 with the issuance of a complaint
relating to newspaper and television advertising for Geritol. See text ac-
companying notes 33-41 infra.
2. 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45 () (1970).
4. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
5. Id. at 439.
6. 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288
F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961); Piuma v. United
States, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942); United
States v. Smith Fencer Corp., 312 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mich. 1970); United
States v. Sav-Cote Chem. Labs., Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. f 73,439 (D.N.J.
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however, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit indicated
dissatisfaction with Hindman, suggesting that jury trials in pro-
ceedings to enforce cease and desist orders were incompatible
with effective regulation under the FTC Act.9
This Note challenges the conventional approaches used to
evaluate a defendant's right to a jury trial in actions to enforce
FTC administrative orders. The analysis begins with a descrip-
tion of the process by which regulation of an unfair or deceptive
trade practice under section 5 (a) of the FTC Act' ° develops from
exhortation to official sanction in the form of a cease and desist
order, and summarizes this development in Williams. As a
first step in striking a balance between administrative effective-
ness and fairness to the defendant in an enforcement action, Part
II evaluates the criminal nature of section 5 (l) proceedings and
the need for sixth amendment protections under the Constitu-
tion, but it concludes that the statute is only quasi-criminal and
not likely to support the right to a criminal jury trial. Part III
of the Note evaluates a defendant's rights under the seventh
amendment by using the traditional method of determining
whether jury trials were available in analogous actions under
the common law. Since this approach yields no right to a civil
jury trial and is incapable of reconciling effective administrative
enforcement with fairness to the defendant, Part IV proposes a
functional approach to seventh amendment analysis derived from
a recent Supreme Court decision and suggests two standards by
which to separate court from jury issues in FTC enforcement
proceedings.
I. REGULATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES UNDER THE FTC ACT
A. THE STATUTORY FRAmEWORK
Passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 re-
sulted from a widespread conviction that the growing power of
giant corporations to manipulate trade was weakening compe-
tition.11 The reports of both the Senate and House committees
1969). These cases are among those in which summary judgment for the
government was granted in section 5 (1) actions, although the conduct al-
legedly within the scope of the FTC order was not identical to the con-
duct that the order originally proscribed.
8. 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
9. Id. at 259 n.2.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
11. T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMiuIssio 1 (1932).
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clearly indicated that the FTC was to have broad power to regu-
late unfair trade practices12 under section 5 (a),13 and recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have reaffirmed this power to pro-
scribe practices deceptive to consumers, regardless of their ef-
fects on competition."4 When the Commission has reason to be-
lieve that any person or entity is engaging in misleading or de-
ceptive trade practices, and when the question cannot be resolved
by informal, nonadjudicatory means,15 the Commission may issue
a complaint charging a violation of section 5.16 At the resulting
hearings, if the party charged fails to rebut the evidence support-
ing the complaint,17 the administrative law judge'8 must state
his findings in writing and issue a cease and desist order prohib-
iting further "violation of the law so charged in said com-
plaint."19 Within 60 days after the issuance of the order, each
named respondent must file with the Commission a detailed writ-
ten report of his compliance and must provide any additional
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914); S. REP.
No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). There was no indication of any
intent to alter this broad discretion in 1938 when Congress added "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" to the original language pro-
scribing unfair methods of competition. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, §
3, 52 Stat. 111. See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
13. "The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent per-
sons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1970).
14. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
15. 16 C.F.R. § 2.21(a) (1974) states:
The Commission, when it has information indicating that a
person or persons may be engaging in a practice which may in-
volve violation of a law administered by it, and if it deems the
public interest will be fully safeguarded thereby may afford
... the opportunity to have a matter disposed of on an informal
nonadjudicatory basis.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
17. Id. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 921 (1959). 16
C.F.R. § 3.43 (a) (1974) states: "Counsel representing the Commission
... shall have the burden of proof, but the proponent of any factual
proposition shall be required to sustain the burden of proof with respect
thereto."
18. "Hearings in adjudicative proceedings shall be presided over by
a duly qualified hearing examiner or by the Commission or one or more
members of the Commission sitting as administrative law judges." 16
C.F.R. § 3.42(a) (1974).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (1970). Any party to a proceeding can appeal
such findings to the Commission if within ten days of the completion of
service of the initial decision he files a notice of his intention to appeal.
16 C.F.R. § 3.52(a) (1974).
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information the Commission may request.2 0  Section 5(c) allows
those subject to cease and desist orders to obtain review of the
administrative proceedings in the courts of appeals.21  The re-
viewing court may affirm, modify, or set aside the order,22 but to
the extent that the findings of the Commission are supported
by substantial evidence,23 they are conclusive and binding on the
court.
24
In 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Act,25 streamlining
the process by which a cease and desist order becomes "final,"
or enforceable by the courts. Prior to 1938, enforcement was
available only after a contempt decree was issued by the court
of appeals upon proof of violation of the Commission's order.
Since the assessment of penalties for contempt required evidence
that new activities of the defendant had violated this decree,
the respondent was given three opportunities to use deceptive
trade practices before sustaining any penalty-once before a com-
plaint and order, again before the contempt decree, and again
before enforcement. The Wheeler-Lea amendment removed a
step from this process by providing that a cease and desist order
automatically becomes final upon judicial review or expiration of
20. 16 C.F.R. § 3.61 (a) (1974) provides in part:
Where the order prohibits the use of a false advertisement of a
food, drug, device, or cosmetic which may be injurious to health
because of results from its use under the conditions prescribed
in the advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary
or usual, or if the use of such advertisement is with intent to
defraud or mislead, or where the order was issued under the
Flammable Fabrics Act, or in any other case where the circum-
stances so warrant, the order may provide for an interim report
stating whether and how respondents intend to comply.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c) (1970). Anyone subject to an order may ob-
tain review "within any circuit where the method of competition or the
act or practice in question was used or where such person . . . resides
or carries on business." Id.
22. Id. In addition, section 5(e) provides that the courts of ap-
peals are to give precedence to such proceedings over other cases pend-
ing and are to expedite them in every way.
23. Evidence is substantial if a "reasonable mind might accept [it]
as adequate to support a conclusion." NLRB v. Columbian Enameling
& Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In giving effect to this principle, the
Court has declared that an administrative judgment is to stand if it has
"warrant in the record," or if it has a "rational basis." ICC v. Jersey
City, 322 U.S. 503, 513 (1944). NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111, 131 (1944); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125,
145-46 (1939). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951) (substantial evidence test requires reviewing court to examine
the record of the agency proceedings as a whole).
24. 15 U.S.C § 45(c) (1970).
25. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
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the time for such review .2  Consequently, the FTC need no
longer obtain a separate contempt decree and prove its violation,
but may seek enforcement immediately after its order becomes fi-
nal. 27
In addition to streamlining the enforcement procedure, Con-
gress enacted section 5(l),28 which augments the contempt proce-
dure by permitting the FTC to bring an action in federal district
court to recover civil penalties from those violating cease and
desist orders. The significance of this addition is evident from
the substantial penalties made available to the FTC. Section 5 (1)
originally provided:
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an or-
der of the Commission to cease and desist after it has become
final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and
pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $5,000
for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and
may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United
States. 29
In 1950, Congress amended section 5 () to make it clear that each
separate violation of an order may constitute a separate offense,
"except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure
or neglect to obey a final order of the Commission each day
of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a sep-
arate offense."30  In 1973, Congress further augmented the en-
forcement powers of the FTC by increasing the maximum penalty
from $5,000 to $10,000 for each violation of a cease and desist
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (g) (1970). Initial review is before the court
of appeals, and after such review, a petition for certiorari may be filed.
27. H.R. RsP. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Since the Com-
mission is no longer required to prove a second violation before obtainingjudicial enforcement, this prevents a respondent from "playing fast and
loose with the Commission's order, neither obeying it nor asking the
court to set it aside." S. RP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1937).
28. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45(i) (1970)).
29. Id.
30. Act of Mar. 16, 1950, ch. 61, 64 Stat. 21 (codified at 15 U.S.C.§ 45(1) (1970)) (emphasis added). The majority in Williams said of
this clause:
The "day" concept entered only in a clause dealing with the sit-
uation where a defendant commanded to do some affirmative act
has failed to do anything at all. Appellants say, with some
force, that it is anomalous that a defendant who ignores a man-
datory order of the Commission shall be liable for only $5,000
a day [since changed to $10,000] but one who affirmatively vio-
lates the order in 30 different places on the same day might be
held for $150,000. The answer is that ... Congress relied on the
good sense of the FTC in [demanding penalties] and, failing
that, on the discretion of the court to prevent such an outrageous
result.
498 F.2d at 435-36.
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order.3 1 This streamlined enforcement process coupled with po-
tentially large liability has led one FTC Commissioner to char-
acterize section 5 (1) as a "sword of Damocles suspended above
[the defendant's] head, poised to fall with devastating effect
'332
B. SECTION 5 (1) PROCEEDINGS IN UNITED STATES V.
J. B. WmLLIAs Co.
The controversy between the FTC and the J.B. Williams
Company began in 1962 when the Commission issued a complaint
stating that Williams had falsely represented its iron and vita-
min product, Geritol, as "an effective general remedy for tired-
ness, loss of strength or a run-down feeling. 33 3 The Commission
alleged that Geritol was "effective only in the small minority
of cases where these conditions were caused by a deficiency in
iron or in the vitamins contained in Geritol.134 After hearings
before the FTC, the administrative law judge entered a cease and
desist order prohibiting any advertisement of Geritol or of prod-
ucts containing "substantially similar properties... which rep-
resent[ed] directly or by implication that the use of such prep-
aration will be beneficial in the treatment or relief of tiredness,
loss of strength, run-down feeling or irritability .... ,,3r Wil-
31. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 591,
amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970). This amendment also extended the
penalty clause to include all Commission orders rather than merely
cease and desist orders and added injunctive relief to the enforcement
power of the district court.
32. Quaker Oats Co., [1961-63 Transfer Binder] CCH F.T.C. Com-
plaints, Orders, Stipulations f 15858, at 20,653 (1962) (dissenting opin-
ion).
33. 498 F.2d at 418.
34. Id.
35. The entire paragraph containing the broadest language of the
order prohibited advertisements that represented
directly or by implication that the use of [Geritol or any sub-
stantially similar product] will be beneficial in the treatment or
relief of tiredness, loss of strength, run-down feeling, nervous-
ness or irritability, unless such advertisement expressly limits
the claim of effectiveness of the preparation to those persons
whose symptoms are due to an existing deficiency of one or
more of the vitamins contained in the preparation, or to an exist-
ing deficiency of iron or to iron deficiency anemia, and further,
unless the advertisement also discloses clearly and conspicu-
ously that: (1) in the great majority of persons who experience
such symptoms, these symptoms are not caused by a deficiency
of one or more of the vitamins contained in the preparation or
by iron deficiency or iron deficiency anemia; and (2) for such
persons the preparation will be of no benefit.
498 F.2d at 418-19 n.2.
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liams filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, and the court affirmed the order.8 6
After it rejected three compliance reports submitted by Wil-
liams, the FTC submitted to the Attorney General a draft com-
plaint alleging three types of violations of the cease and desist
order. First, the complaint charged that certain commercials
misrepresented that Geritol could build "power" in "iron-poor
blood." Second, the complaint alleged that commercials depict-
ing consumers as "sad" at the beginning of the commercial and
"glad" at the end, "thanks to Geritol,"3 7 misrepresented that the
defendant's product was a general cure for tiredness. Third, the
complaint charged that commercials for FemIron, allegedly a
preparation "substantially similar" to Geritol, failed to disclose
that iron deficiency anemia was not present in most women and
thereby implied that the product was an effective general remedy
for tiredness. The Attorney General brought suit under section
5(1) in the Southern District of New York for civil penalties of
$500,000 from each of two defendants, the J.B. Williams Com-
pany, manufacturer and distributor of Geritol and FemIron, and
the Parkson Advertising Agency, an affiliate that marketed the
products.2s The district court granted the Government's motion
for summary judgment and assessed penalties of $456,000 against
Williams and $356,000 against Parkson.s 9 Reversing in part, the
36. J.B. Williams Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
37. The defendants in their brief characterized the "sad-glad" for-
mats as "virtually cliches" of the advertising industry. Brief for Appel-
lant at 36, United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
For an explanation of the sad-glad commercial and the impressions con-
veyed thereby, see United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521,
539 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
38. The Williams majority held that since the FTC had requested
only a judgment against both defendants "'in the total sum of $500,000,'
the Attorney General was without authority to seek that amount against
each under the fair implications of our decision in United States v. St.
Regis Paper Co. [355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966) ]." 498 F.2d at 437. The
thrust of the St. Regis decision was that Congress had given the task of
determining when and what penalties should be sought to the FTC and
not to the Attorney General. 355 F.2d at 695-98.
39. The district court noted that the size of the penalty should be
based on a number of factors including "financial ability to pay..., the
degree of harm which defendants may have caused by disseminating the
challenged advertisements, and their good or bad faith in disseminating
these advertisements in violation of the FTC order." 354 F. Supp. at 548.
See United States v. H.M. Prince Textiles, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 383, 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,478 (W.D. Pa. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1963); United




court of appeals held that Williams° was entitled to have a jury
determine whether the word "power" and the "sad-glad" format
did in fact misrepresent Geritol to be a general remedy for tired-
ness and anemia. The court remanded the case for a jury trial
on these issues and affirmed summary judgment on the counts
relating to FemIron.4 1
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE SECTION
5 (1) ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Both the sixth and seventh amendments are possible sources
of a right to a jury trial in cases like Williams, but reliance on
the sixth amendment 42 would significantly increase the difficulty
of enforcing cease and desist orders under section 5 (l). The con-
stitutional protections granted to defendants under the sixth
amendment impose greater burdens on the prosecutor than are
borne by the plaintiff in civil litigation under the seventh amend-
ment. A criminal defendant is entitled to a more rigid, "reason-
able doubt" standard of proof43 and is also entitled to litigate
before a jury every question material to his defense.4 4  These
rights, if applied in an enforcement action under section 5 (1),
might sharply limit the power of the Commission under the FTC
Act. Courts assuming that these proceedings are civil have con-
sistently held that their own role is limited to adjudicating vio-
lations of cease and desist orders and does not include relitigating
the factual foundation established in prior agency proceedings.
If the proceedings were deemed criminal, however, the sixth
amendment would entitle the defendant to submit to the jury
40. The court of appeals set aside the judgment against Parkson,
holding that Parkson was not an independent entity and therefore could
not be independently liable, and, in the alternative, that the Attorney
General was not authorized to seek a penalty greater than that originally
sought by the FTC. 498 F.2d at 436-39.
41. Id. at 434.
42. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
43. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
44. One commentator has stated:
[I]t is only in civil cases that the law confines the jury's fact-
finding province solely to questions upon which "reasonable men
may differ." In criminal cases, the jury is entrusted with all
factual questions, whether reasonable men can differ on them or
not. And even in civil cases, the necessary consequence of hav-
ing the jury decide even one issue is to entrust the entire case
into its hands.
Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REV.
386, 395 (1954) (emphasis added). See note 78 infra.
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the factual issues underlying an order, since the establishment
of this factual foundation through administrative procedure is
not compatible with the accepted rules and constitutional guar-
antees governing criminal trials. 45 Thus, a sixth amendment
trial might offer more comprehensive protections to the defend-
ant, but it would severely restrict the agency's power to determine
what conduct is unfair or deceptive, because its findings would
be entitled to no deference in enforcement proceedings. Under
the seventh amendment, the defendant may also have a right
to a jury trial, but the courts would have some discretion over
the factual issues submitted to the jury.
Attempting to avail themselves of the broader protections
of the sixth amendment, the defendants in Williams argued that
the penalties under section 5(1) constituted punishment and
thus were criminal. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's rejection of this argument, holding that rights associated
with criminal proceedings are to be denied when Congress has
characterized a remedy as "civil" and when the only conse-
quence of an adverse judgment is a money penalty.4 6 This ra-
tionale, however, overlooks the Supreme Court's position that
courts must determine whether a statute is criminal in nature
not by "the designation of the exaction, [but by] its substance
and application."47 In discharging this responsibility, courts have
tended to consider a statute criminal where the penalty is serious,
where the statute operates to penalize only knowing violations
and to deter the proscribed behavior, and where the sanction has
a punitive purpose."
A. THE SEaOUSNESS OF THE PENALTY
One factor courts have used to determine whether a statute
is criminal is the seriousness of the penalty that it imposes.
49
45. Professor Davis has stated in his treatise on administrative law:
One kind of power of adjudication which clearly cannot be con-
ferred upon an administrative agency is the power to determine
guilt or innocence in criminal cases. The reason is that the crim-
inal defendant is entitled to special procedural protection of the
kind that is given neither in civil proceedings in court nor in ad-
ministrative proceedings.
1 K. DAVIS, ADimNISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.13 (1958).
46. 498 F.2d at 421.
47. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935).
48. For a review of tests courts have applied in evaluating a defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights, see Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Coax.pu L. REv.
478, 491-506 (1974).
49. Id. at 501-05.
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The more serious the potential loss to the defendant as a result
of an adverse judgment, the more likely it is that he will be
entitled to the comprehensive protections of the sixth amend-
ment. Although the Williams majority opinion, in concluding
that section 5 (1) was not criminal, assigned much weight to the
monetary nature of civil penalties, the distinction between for-
feiture of property and deprivation of liberty by imprisonment
has not received much judicial support as the dividing line be-
tween criminal and civil statutes.5 0 The Supreme Court has held
that property forfeitures are criminal proceedings, entitling de-
fendants to fourth amendment protections and the fifth amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination.5 ' Notwithstanding
the fact that one early court had looked beyond the statutory
label to hold a penalty for $300,000 punitive and therefore granted
the defendant a criminal jury trial,52 the Williams court suggested
that no such precedent existed.53 Generally, where penalties have
been extremely large, courts have tended to look more closely at
the nature of the statute than at whether its designation is "civil"
or "criminal."54 Since potential liability under section 5 (l) is at
least as large as those penalties for which courts have granted
criminal jury trials, the sanction appears sufficiently "serious"
to render the statute "criminal" and to warrant sixth amendment
protections.
50. Id. at 502.
51. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). See Hepner v.
United States, 213 U.S. 103, 111 (1909). The Supreme Court has left
open the question of the right to counsel in such actions. Justice Powell,
concurring in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 51 (1972), where the
Court held that a defendant had a right to counsel if he faced incarcer-
ation, stated:
It would be illogical-and without discernible support in the
Constitution-to hold that no discretion may ever be exercised
[in according a defendant criminal protections] . . . in "non-jail"
petty-offense cases which may result in far more serious conse-
quences than a few hours or days of incarceration.
52. United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893). The court
asked:
Now, if the government enacts a statute which provides that a
case in its nature criminal, whose purpose is punishment, whose
prosecutor is the state, and whose successful prosecution dis-
graces the defendant, and forfeits his property to the state as
punishment for crime, may be brought in the form of a civil suit,
does that change the rule of evidence that ought to be applied
to it?
Id. at 129-30.
53. 498 F.2d at 421.
54. Wisconsin v. Pelican, 127 U.S. 265 (1888). See also United
States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893).
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B. THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
1. Scienter
Some courts, consistently with the traditional treatment of
the criminal lawi have held that a statute is criminal if it re-
quires scienter for conviction.56 Statutory crimes, however, in-
clude crimes imposing liability without fault and crimes requir-
ing only objective fault, such as negligence, as well as crimes
requiring subjective fault, such as knowledge or willfulness. 57
Courts evaluating the punitive nature of a statute in modern ac-
tions, therefore, have not given conclusive weight to the require-
ment of a "knowing violation"; the presence of scienter is only
one factor that may indicate the need to grant a defendant crim-
inal rights. 8 The Supreme Court has held that scienter is not
a necessary element of liability under section 5 (1)," but lower
courts have nevertheless mitigated the penalties under that sec-
tion to reflect the "good faith" of the defendant. Mistake, in-
advertence, and ordinary negligence have not usually triggered
substantial liability, but where willfulness is proved, courts have
levied maximum penalties.60 Thus, although a knowing viola-
tion, or scienter, is not required on the face of section 5 (1), a
willful violation is frequently a factor in determining the amount
of the penalty when the statute is actually applied. In this re-
spect, section 5 (1), in its operation, has some criminal character-
istics.
2. Deterrence
Another factor courts have considered in evaluting the oper-
ation of a statute is its capacity to deter the penalized behavior.6 1
An important purpose of criminal sanctions is to prevent certain
undesirable conduct by making the commission of proscribed acts
unattractive.6 2 Punishment may have a "special" deterrent ef-
55. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CmnnlnAL LAW 218 (1972).
56. Charney, supra note 48, at 495.
57. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 55, at 191-93.
58. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
59. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965).
60. Compare United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
% 70,478 (W.D. Pa. 1962) ($5000 for each of nine willful violations) with
United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 Trade Cas. f 69,601 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (total penalty of $1000 for 16 violations where defendant's intent
was unclear and defendant had otherwise complied with order for 15
years).
61. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935).
62. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 55, at 21.
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fect on the criminal by giving him an unpleasant experience he
will not want to endure again or a "general" deterrent effect
by discouraging the public from committing such crimes. Both
civil and criminal sanctions have a deterrent effect since the pen-
alty discourages a defendant from behaving in a manner that
causes injury to others,63 but this effect in civil cases is usually
subordinate to the redress of an individual claimant. Congress,
in its recent action to double the penalties under section 5 (1)
from $5,000 to $10,000, stated that its purpose was to prevent all
deceptive acts and practices in commerce, as well as to deter vio-
lations by those already subject to FTC orders.64 Like a criminal
statute, then, section 5 (1) appears to have a general as well as
a specific deterrent effect.
C. THE PURpOSE OF =i SAcTioN
Courts evaluating the criminal nature of a statute have also
considered the extent to which it serves a punitive purpose.0 6
Whereas a punitive statute seeks retribution for wrongs without
need for quantifying the loss to the plaintiff or another person,(6
a remedial statute requires measurement of the damages that
may accrue to an individual or class of individuals and provides
compensation for those injured by the proscribed conduct.0 7 Al-
though section 5 (l) is variable in that civil penalties of "up to
10,000 dollars" may be assessed for one violation, thereby sug-
gesting remuneration commensurate with the plaintiff's injury,
the size of the penalty need not correspond to the loss to the
Government. Courts weigh the probable injury to competitors
and consumers, but the Government need not prove actual injury
to collect civil penalties.6 8 The purpose of section 5 (1), therefore,
is at best partly remedial and partly punitive.
63. Id. at 22-23.
64. Congress stated in its recent amendment of section 5 () that its
purpose was to ensure the "enforcement of the laws the Commission ad-
ministers." Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408 (b), 87 Stat.
576.
65. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Penfield Co.
v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Cf. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24
(7th Cir. 1971).
66. See Charney, supra note 48, at 508.
67. Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909).
68. See United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 132-33(S.D.N.Y. 1971), where Judge Frankel discussed similar penalty provi-
sions, comparing them to liquidated damages for the costs of the Gov-
ernment's enforcement efforts and for injury caused to the Government
by the frustration of its economic policies. See also United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1943).
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Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in Williams, evalu-
ated the criminal nature of section 5 (1) without considering the
seriousness of its penalty, its operation, or the purpose of its sanc-
tion. Citing Hepner v. United States69 and Helvering v. Mitch-
ell,70 he stated that appellants had not "directed our attention
to any civil penalty provision that [had] been held sufficiently
'criminal' in nature to invoke the protections of the Sixth Amend-
ment."7 1 Those cases, however, evaluated a defendant's rights un-
der statutes with language and purposes different from those of
section 5(l). In Hepner the Government was suing for a fixed
penalty of only $1000, the maximum amount recoverable under
the Alien Immigration Act;7 2 in Mitchell, involving a civil pen-
alty for tax evasion, the statute limited recovery to an amount
proportionate to the costs incurred by the Government in estab-
lishing its case against the defendant.7 3 As illustrated by the
district court's judgment in Williams, however, liability under
section 5(l) can total millions of dollars. By permitting cases
evaluating statutes with penalties substantially smaller than sec-
tion 5(l) to determine the right to a criminal jury trial in all
civil penalty actions, Judge Friendly not only avoided a constitu-
tional analysis of the substance and application of section 5(l),
but implied that Congress could undermine sixth amendment
rights by simply labeling an otherwise criminal sanction a "civil
penalty." A civil designation of a monetary penalty, however,
does not justify denial of a criminal jury trial where a defendant
is in fact punished for his conduct;74 only application of the
factors traditionally used by courts to evaluate a defendant's
sixth amendment rights is sufficient to measure the punitive ef-
fect of section 5(l).
The court's reliance in Williams upon the civil designation
of section 5 (1) may in part be justified by the fact that analysis
of these factors is inconclusive. Nevertheless, the Williams ap-
proach does not account for the statute's criminal characteristics.
Where such characteristics predominate in a statutory action,
69. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
70. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
71. 498 F.2d at 421.
72. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1215.
73. The Supreme Court held that because Congress provided a dis-
tinctly civil procedure for the collection of an additional 50 percent pen-
alty for fraudulently filing an income tax return, it intended the action
to be civil rather than criminal. 303 U.S. at 402.
74. Charney, supra note 48, at 482.
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courts have held that the rules governing criminal actions pre-
vail. A section 5 (l) proceeding, however, appears to fall within
that category of actions labeled "quasi-criminal," for which
courts have granted fourth and fifth amendment rights and have
suggested that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment
may be available.7 5 Thus the seriousness of the penalty, the im-
portance of scienter and deterrence, and the punitive purpose of
section 5(l) all suggest the criminal character of the statute, but
whether they require a sixth amendment jury trial has not been
established. Since the right to a jury trial is available under
the seventh amendment in quasi-criminal actions, courts have not
felt compelled to determine whether the same right is also guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment 7 6 In proceedings to enforce ad-
ministrative orders, like those under section 5 (l), this approach
is especially convenient: a jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment does not require relitigation of the factual foundation of
cease and desist orders, the determination of which is vested by
Congress exclusively in the agency.77 Nevertheless, where pen-
alties have some criminal characteristics, abandoning all the pro-
tections and attendant rights of a criminal jury trial might vio-
late the sixth amendment, especially since only a very fine and
technical distinction often separates criminal from civil penalties.
In such quasi-criminal cases, the strict right accorded a criminal
defendant to litigate every material issue could combine with the
flexibility given courts under the seventh amendment to control
the issues that go to the jury, thereby permitting a defendant
to relitigate all issues material to his defense, including those
tried by the agency, except in those cases where the regulatory
power of the agency would be impaired.7 8 This approach avoids
abandoning all the protections of the sixth amendment once a
statute is found to be civil as it permits some traditionally crim-
inal rights to attach to jury trials under the seventh amendment.
75. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (penalties were
quasi-criminal for purposes of the fourth amendment and that part of
the fifth amendment which declares that no person shall be a witness
against himself).
76. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
77. United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257,
259 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
78. Charney, supra note 48, at 483. Other criminal rights that may
offer added protection to a defendant in a section 5 (1) civil penalty ac-
tion include the right of confrontation, the right of compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in one's favor, and the right to a speedy trial.
Id. at 478-79.
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II. SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE SECTION
5 () ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Recent declarations by the United States Supreme Court
have favored seventh amendment jury trials in modern statutory
actions.7 9 This support for civil juries may indicate a tension
between a recognition that fairness requires the submission of
important issues for jury decision and a reluctance to restrict
judicial discretion to limit the issues triable before a lay panel.80
In section 5(l) enforcement proceedings, this discretion is re-
flected in the courts' ability to direct a verdict where jury deter-
mination of an issue would risk nullification of congressional in-
tent to regulate trade effectively, i.e., where the Commission's
cease and desist order clearly indicates that the defendant's con-
duct was prohibited. Commentators disagree on the standards
that define the scope of the seventh amendment right generally,
but they agree that the pro-jury bias reflected in recent decisions
is consistent with the pro-jury bias of the Constitution.81 Never-
theless, deciding what conduct violates a final cease and desist
order is tantamount to measuring the effective scope of the order,
and a lay determination of this issue, without deference to the
agency's findings, may usurp the broad discretionary power
vested in the FTC by Congress.8 2 An analysis of civil jury rights
under section 5 (1), therefore, must attempt to reconcile a de-
fendant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial on disputed
factual issues with the preservation of agency effectiveness. This
Part attempts the reconciliation in three steps: first, it considers
the perspectives from which judges have viewed the compatibil-
ity of juries with administrative regulation; second, it challenges
the traditional approaches to the evaluation of a defendant's
rights under the seventh amendment; and third, it examines the
recent shift by the Supreme Court toward a "functional" ap-
79. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959).
80. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); cf. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
81. See McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial:
A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1(1967); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 57 MmN. L. REv. 639 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HAav. L. REv. 1, 172-76 (1970); Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy
Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment, The Federal Rules, and a Re-
ceding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. UB. L. 459 (1971).
82. See United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d
257, 259 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
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proach to the seventh amendment, evaluating the impact of this
shift on traditional analysis and the role of this approach as a
source of civil jury rights independent of those provided under
the common law. Analysis of the functional approach is contin-
ued in Part IV with an evaluation of its capacity to separate court
from jury issues. Part IV also proposes two standards by which
courts can reconcile the agency's power to regulate with the de-
fendant's interest in litigating issues of fact before a jury.
A. Two PERSPECTIVES ON SEVENTH AmENDMENT RIGHTS
Congressional silence regarding the right to jury trial under
section 5 (1) has allowed much room for dispute over the respec-
tive roles of the court, agency, and jury in the enforcement pro-
ceeding.83 If Congress had indicated in the language of the FTC
Act or in legislative history what deference courts enforcing
Commission orders were to give to administrative findings, as
it had for courts reviewing them,84 it might have avoided the
conflict between the tradition of permitting jury trials in civil
actions and the tradition of barring civil juries from administra-
tive proceedings.85 In the absence of such guidance, however,
section 5(l) caused a sharp division between the majority and
the dissenting judge in Williams. Writing from one perspective,
the Williams majority held that juries were compatible with the
administrative process, reasoning that civil penalty proceedings
were like other civil actions in which the court's adjudicative
power is "plenary." The majority held that where such a clear
right to jury trial was applicable, an equally clear congressional
statement was necessary to revoke the right.8 6 Congress, how-
ever, has the power to expressly provide for civil juries in any
statutory action,87 and, assuming it was aware of this when en-
acting the Wheeler-Lea Act, its silence with respect to the jury
trial right could imply a negative as well as positive intention.
Moreover, the applicability of the seventh amendment is not uni-
versally recognized in civil penalty suits. Some courts have held
83. Judge Oakes, dissenting in Williams, said: "[I]t is conceded by
all that neither the statute itself nor the legislative history make any di-
rect reference to the jury trial question." 498 F.2d at 446. See also
United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
84. See notes 22-24 supra. and accompanying text.
85. Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1937).
86. 498 F.2d at 425.
87. See 5 J. MooPE, FEDERAL PRACTIc E 38.12, at 128.24 (2d ed.
1948).
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that such actions are equitable rather than legal88 and have de-
nied jury trials on this basis. Consequently, no clear intention
to grant a right to a jury trial may be inferred from congres-
sional silence.
Writing from the opposite perspective, the dissenting opinion
in Williams by Judge Oakes argued that section 5 (1) was intended
to broaden administrative powers rather than to grant plenary
power to the court.8 9 He criticized the majority opinion for at-
tempting to interpret section 5(l) as if it existed "in a statutory
vacuum," and argued that the court's "task in interpreting sep-
arate provisions of a single Act is to give the Act 'the most har-
monious, comprehensive meaning possible' in light of the legisla-
tive policy and purpose."90  Such an approach, according to
Judge Oakes, recognizes the need to preserve an active adminis-
trative role in determining what conduct violates the agency's
own orders.
As the dissenting opinion suggests, permitting a jury to de-
cide whether a defendant has violated a final cease and desist or-
der appears to infringe on the power exclusively vested by Con-
gress in the Commission to interpret what trade practices are un-
fair or deceptive under the FTC Act. Until recently, such con-
siderations would have had little bearing on the right to a civil
jury, which courts have traditionally determined according to the
chance resemblance of an action to an historical common-law an-
tecedent.91 But the test for this seventh amendment right has be-
come more sensitive to the nature of issues and the context in
which they arise, permitting a court to vary and condition consti-
tutional protections to suit the issues, rather than the character of
the overall action. Depending upon its perspective of seventh
amendment rights and congressional intent, therefore, a court
may squarely face or completely avoid the unique considerations
88. United States v. Shaughnessy, 86 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1949);
Pallant v. Sinatra, 59 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
89. Judge Oakes stated:
[T]he FTC plays the key role in determining whether its own
order has been violated and in seeking sanctions for such viola-
tion .... Even given some unasserted right of appellants to
secure a narrow review by way of a declaratory judgment as
to whether a specific commercial is in compliance with ... [its
own] order, it seems beyond dispute that the FTC is to use its
expertise in construing the order and applying it to "new" ad-
vertising.
498 F.2d at 443.
90. Id. at 411, quoting Weinberger v. Hunson, Westcott & Dunning,
Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 (1973).
91. See text accompanying notes 92-96 infra.
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necessary to balance effective regulation with fairness to the de-
fendant. The Williams majority chose the traditional approach
and thus failed to address the peculiar relationships between
court, agency, and jury in the enforcement of administrative or-
ders in civil penalty actions.
B. THE TRADIIONAL APPROACH TO SEVENTH AmENDmENT
RIGHTs: Tim HISTORICAL TEST
The test traditionally applied to resolve the seventh amend-
ment question is historical: "If a jury would have been impan-
eled in this kind of case in 1791 English practice, then generally
a jury is required by the seventh amendment." 92 The historical
test is suggested by the language of the seventh amendment it-
self:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise re-exam-
ined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.93
Under the common law, civil actions were either legal, with an
attendant right to jury trial, or equitable, in which case the court
would try the proceeding itself.94 Consistently with the formal
92. Wolfram, supra note 81, at 640. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474, 476 (1935), where the Court stated: "In order to ascertain the
scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to
the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the
adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791." See also NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Baltimore & Caro-
lina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1898); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745
(No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). The Court in Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974), citing Justice Story in Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830), elaborated on the nature
of the "common law":
The phrase "common law," found in this clause, is used in con-
tradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurispru-
dence .... By common law [the framers of the amendment]
meant ... not merely suits, which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinc-
tion to those where equitable rights alone were recognized and
equitable remedies were administered .... In a just sense,
the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits
which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever
might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.
94. With respect to the law and equity distinction, Professor Wolf-
ram stated:
The exception of "equitable" cases from the seventh amendment
is insupportable on any principle that readily distinguishes be-
tween 'law" cases and "equity" cases .... [I]t is doubtful, at
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rules for distinguishing legal from equitable suits, more fre-
quently resulting from the political struggle between the King
and Parliament9 5 than from any analysis of the merits of a jury
trial in a particular proceeding, courts applying the historical test
have categorized statutory actions by searching for common-law
counterparts, focusing on the designation of the action rather than
on its substance and application.9 6
A majority of decisions have held that a civil penalty action
is equivalent to the common-law action for debt, in which there
was a constitutional right to jury trial,9 7 while a minority have
likened such a proceeding to an action in equity, triable to the
court without a jury.9 8 Debt lies when a defendant allegedly
owes the plaintiff a sum certain, an amount established either
by agreement between the parties or by operation of law;99 prior
to 1791, such actions were typically brought by creditors for the
collection of loans.100 Courts have, however, held that a section
5 (l) proceeding more closely resembles an action for liquidated
damages to compensate the Government for the cost of enforce-
ment efforts and for injury to its economic policies than it does an
action for debt.' 0 ' Since in a section 5 (l) action the Government
need not prove an actual debt, but only a breach of the obligation
to compete fairly which is implied from the decision to trade in
interstate commerce, the statute appears to provide a range of
least today, that "equity" invokes the use of any greater discre-
tion than do many of the "legal" remedies that nonetheless are
tried to a jury. An assertion that "law" cases tend to be less
complicated and thus less likely to require the specialized abil-
ities of a judge trained by experience in the skills of fact finding
would seem, in 1791 and today, both to be highly conjectural and
to overlook some of the immensely complicated cases that juries
determine daily.
Wolfram, supra note 81, at 731.
95. F. JAMES, Cvr. PRocEDURE § 8.2, at 346 (1965). James concluded
that "the line dividing equity from law [was never] ... the product of
a rational choice between issues which were suited to court or to jury
trial." Id. § 8.1, at 344.
96. See, e.g., cases cited in note 92 supra.
97. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (defend-
ant entitled to jury trial in suit for civil penalty under Alien Immigration
Act); United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950) (United
States claim for damages not incident to equitable relief, but equivalent
to old common-law action of debt).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Shaughnessy, 86 F. Supp. 175 (D.
Mass. 1949). See also Pallant v. Sinatra, 59 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
99. Nelson v. Zahn Grain Co., 191 Okla. 181, 183, 127 P.2d 803, 805(1942); Gasper v. Mayer, 171 Okla. 457, 460, 43 P.2d 467, 471 (1935).
100. D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEw NATION 72-89 (1971).
101. United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (1971).
See also United States ex tel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1943).
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liquidated damages for the use of the courts. Cases of such statu-
tory forfeitures and penalties were historically tried by courts of
equity sitting without juries.102
Attempting to analogize a section 5 (1) proceeding to the com-
mon-law action for debt, the Williams court rejected the Gov-
ernment's argument that the variable nature of section 5(l), al-
lowing penalties of "up to $5,000 per violation," meant that it
was not an action for a sum certain. The court stated that "[t] he
legislative background... demonstrates that Congress replaced
the proposed fixed penalty with a variable one in order to give the
penalty provision more flexibility, not to avoid the requirement
of a jury trial. ' 10 3 The reasons for making a penalty variable,
however, are not relevant to the question whether the penalty
resembles a common-law action for debt; if the penalty is vari-
able, the sum is not certain, and no action for debt lies in the
common-law sense.
The Williams majority opinion, however, also relied on
American common-law precedent to support its decision to recog-
nize seventh amendment rights under section 5(l).104 Although
this approach, because of its reliance on developments since 1791,
varies the test traditionally used by the courts, such a "modified"
historical test conforms to the trend away from strict reference to
English common law in the determination of a defendant's right
to a civil jury trial in modern statutory actions. 10 5 Since most
American courts have characterized civil penalties as actions for
debt, the Williams court was arguably correct in holding that a
right to a jury trial existed in corresponding actions under the
common law, though not under the common law prior to 1791. In
fact, however, only the broadest classification of section 5 () as a
"civil penalty" justifies this result. Within this broad classifica-
tion fall variable and invariable penalties, only the latter of which
102. A. CoRBIn, CONTRACTS § 1054 et seq. (1964).
103. 498 F.2d at 427 n.15. Cf. Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103,
106 (1909), in which the Court stated: "It is immaterial in what manner
the obligation was incurred, or by what it is evidenced, if the sum owing
is capable of being definitely ascertained. The act of 1823 fixes the
amount of liability at double the value of the goods received, concealed,
or purchased .... " Section 5(1) does not fix the penalty according to
an invariable formula, but allows the district court to determine the
amount due.
104. 498 F.2d at 423.
105. Professors Wright and Miller state that most modern courts re-
fer to common law as it existed before the merger of law and equity
in 1938, rather than prior to 1791. 9 C. WaIGHT & A. MILLEn, FEDERAL
PRACTICE An PROCEDURE § 2302, at 14-15 (1971).
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are properly designated actions for debt. Even under the modi-
fied historical test, the Williams majority could justify the right
to a jury trial only by focusing on the "civil penalty" designation
and ignoring the variable nature of the penalty. If the penalty is
variable, a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial under the
seventh amendment.
Although the modified historical test may appear to give
greater flexibility to courts searching for common-law actions
to justify seventh amendment rights, this approach still focuses
on categorical counterparts to historical actions and encourages
courts to avoid the substance and application of statutes. More-
over, courts have in fact shaped the right to jury trial under
American common law by referring to pre-1791 practice, so that
even a correct application of the modified historical test is likely
to recur to English law and may not significantly expand the
seventh amendment right to accommodate the pro-jury bias of
the Constitution and recent Supreme Court decisions.10 6 If the
right to a jury trial is to depend upon the merits of seventh
amendment protection rather than upon formal distinctions be-
tween law and equity no longer relevant to modern statutory
actions, courts must break free of traditional classifications under
a historical or "modified" historical test and must adopt a "func-
tional" analysis that examines, for example, the compatibility of
a jury with effective regulation.
C. THE MODERN APPROACH TO SEvETH AMvENDMENT RIGHTS:
IssuE ANALYSIS
In 1970, the Supreme Court departed from traditional sev-
enth amendment analysis in granting a jury trial in a sharehold-
ers' derivative action. Historically, a derivative action brought
by a shareholder as a nominal plaintiff on behalf of a corporation
could only be brought in a court of equity, regardless of whether
the corporate cause of action was at law.10 7 Although these ac-
tions proceeded as if the corporation itself were the plaintiff, thus
permitting all corporate rights and defenses, there was no right
to a jury trial because the suit was in equity. 0 8 The Supreme
106. Those courts looking to pre-1938, rather than pre-1791 law may,
therefore, be using the historical test in a derivative sense. If a strict
view of the historical test were taken, decisions from years before or
after 1791 presumably would be authoritative only to the extent that
they themselves accurately reflect the English state of practice in 1791.
Wolfram, supra note 81, at 642 n.8.
107. N. LATTiN, CORPORATiONS 414-15 (1971).
108. Id. at 415.
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Court held in Ross v. Bernhard,10 9 however, that the right to
a jury trial was guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the
extent that a jury would have been available if the corporation
had brought the action itself.110 In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Stewart indicated the significance of this holding:
Today the Court tosses aside history, logic and over 10D years
of firn precedent to hold that the plaintiff in a shareholder's
derivative suit does indeed have a constitutional right to a trial
by jury. This holding has a questionable basis in policy and no
basis whatsoever in the Constitution.111
What appeared to alarm Justice Stewart particularly was that
the Supreme Court had departed from the historical test, which
stressed the overall nature of statutory actions and sought com-
mon-law counterparts of modem actions, and, instead, had fo-
cused on the "issues" in determining seventh amendment rights
in a shareholder's derivative suit.112 The majority in Ross rea-
soned that the merger of law and equity produced by the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure removed any proce-
dural obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries. Foot-
noting its emphasis on "issues," the court stated: "[T] he 'legal'
nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-
merger custom ... ; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries."1 13
The first two factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Ross,
the premerger custom and the remedy sought, stem from the
modified historical test under which courts look to American
common law for analogous legal and equitable actions to estab-
lish or deny the right to a civil jury trial. Whereas under the
traditional approach the character of an action, if designated
equitable, could have justified denial of seventh amendment
rights entirely, the Ross approach encourages isolation of under-
lying legal issues for a civil jury trial. Although application of
the first two Ross factors does not constitute a "functional" anal-
ysis, the emphasis on issues rather than on the character of the
overall action avoids the formalistic classifications that bound
courts applying the modified historical test and that encouraged
them to reclassify statutes to suit their own concepts of fairness.
The Williams majority correctly referred to the premerger
custom of common-law courts by evaluating the right to a jury
109. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
110. Id. at 542-43.
111. Id. at 544-45.
112. Id. at 538.
113. Id. at 538 n.l0.
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trial under analogous statutes, but it relied on the congressional
label of the statutory sanctions as civil penalties to resolve the
seventh amendment question, 114 overlooking other substantive
differences in similarly worded provisions enacted prior to the
merger of law and equity. Since these differences could generate
issues unlike those generated by a statute embedded in a complex
regulatory scheme," 5 such as section 5(l), the substance of the
statutes as well as their "civil penalty" designation must be ex-
amined.
The first statute Judge Friendly considered in Williams, the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921,116 was referred to frequently
in the legislative history of section 5 (L) as a model for that sec-
tion. 17 The Packers and Stockyards Act, however, is clearly
criminal in nature, since it provides monetary penalties as an al-
ternative to imprisonment and refers to violations as "convic-
tions.""18 It is not useful, therefore, as a premerger analogue by
which seventh amendment rights for a quasi-criminal penalty
may be established. Judge Friendly also referred to section 32 of
the Securities Exchange Act." 9 The usefulness of this reference
is weakened both by the absence of any authority recognizing a
right to jury trial under that provision and by the dissimilarity of
the provision to section 5 (l). Section 32 penalizes the failure by
issuers of stock to file with the SEC the information required by
section 15 (d) of the Act,' 20 and thus sanctions direct violations of
114. 498 F.2d at 426-28.
115. Id. at 451 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 195 (1970).
117. H.R. REp. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937); S. REP. No.
1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); 83 CONG. REC. 397 (1938) (remarks
of Rep. Reece); 80 CoNG. REc. 6594 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler).
118. Any packer ... who fails to obey any order. .. (3) After
such order, or such order as modified, has been sustained by the
courts as provided in section 194 of this title, shall on conviction
be fined not less than $500 nor more than $10,000, or imprisoned
for not less than six months nor more than five years, or both.
Each day during which such failure continues shall be deemed
a separate offense.
7 U.S.C. § 195 (1970).
119. Any issuer which fails to file information, documents, or re-
ports required to be filed under subsection (d) of section 78o of
this title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall forfeit to the
United States the sum of $100 for each and every day such fail-
ure to file shall continue. Such forfeiture, which shall be in lieu
of any criminal penalty for such failure to file which might be
deemed to arise under subsection (a) of this section, shall be
payable into the Treasury of the United States and shall be re-
coverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(b) (1970).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970).
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a statute rather than violations of administrative orders. The
substance of an action under section 32, therefore, is not similar
to that of a section 5 (1) proceeding. 121
Under the Ross approach to premerger tradition, a court may
ignore the designation of the overall action as a "civil penalty"
and seek analogous rights and claims in various common-law ac-
tions.12 2  Because section 5(1) is part of a complex statutory
scheme to enforce administrative orders regulating fraudulent
commercial practices, several aspects of this provision suggest
that it has no premerger analogue. First, the statute authorizes
the Government to bring an action on behalf of the public but
does not authorize suits by private individuals; 23 second, the stat-
ute intends that these actions restrain corporations from misus-
ing their power to defeat public policy; 24 and third, the statute
enforces orders prohibiting fraudulent practices by granting pe-
cuniary relief.12 5  Each of these characteristics of section 5(1)
would have rendered an action equitable under premerger cus-
tom, and therefore, under the first inquiry of Ross, would have
denied a defendant the right to a civil jury trial.
121. Section 16(8) of the Hepburn Act of 1906, 49 U.S.C. § 16(8)
(1970), discussed by the Williams court, is similar to section 5(l) and,
as part of a regulatory statute, this civil penalty action may generate
issues similar to those arising under section 5 (1). No premerger tradition
exists, however, since the seventh amendment question has not been re-
solved under this provision.
122. "Right," "claim," and "issue" were used interchangeably in Ross.
396 U.S. at 537-41. Conceptually, an alleged "right" is the basis for a
"claim" that raises factual "issues." Note, Congressional Provision for
Nonjury Trial, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 410 n.68 (1973).
123. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1965)
(Jury trial not available in action by Secretary of Labor to require em-
ployer to pay back wages owed to employees, because purpose of the
action is "to correct a continuing offense against the public interest." Id.
at 904.); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1239-43
(N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970)
("Under the reasoning of Wirtz v. Jones . . . and under the cases em-
phasizing the public nature of this remedy, the Court must conclude that
the claims herein involved are purely equitable in nature and the
demand for a jury trial must be denied." Id. at 1242.); cf. McGraw v.
Local 43, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 341 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1965).
124. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: EQUITABLE REMEDIEs § 302,
at 538-39 (3d ed. 1905).
125. J. POMEROY, 1 EQUITY JunIsPRuDENcE § 188 (4th ed. 1918), quot-
ing Meek v. Spracher, 87 Va. 162, 169, 12 S.E. 397, 399 (1896):
Fraud and misrepresentation are among the elementary grounds
of equitable jurisdiction and relief. Where they exist, the ques-
tion of an adequate remedy at law is generally a sufficient
ground of equitable jurisdiction; but it is equally true that the
existence of a remedy at law cannot deprive courts of equity ofjurisdiction in a matter that comes within the scope of their ele-
mentary jurisdiction.
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The remedy sought under section 5(l) also appears to lack
a legal common-law counterpart and therefore, under the second
Ross test, a jury trial would not be required. Since section 5(l)
is intended primarily to enforce obedience to orders rather than
to provide adequate compensation for past acts, the remedy is
partially injunctive and equitable under the common law.12 6
Moreover, despite the "civil penalty" designation emphasized
under the modified historical test,1 27 the actual application of sec-
tion 5 (l) reveals the variability of the penalty in contrast to those
fixed by statute allowing seventh amendment rights under the
common law.12 8 If the issue approach is used to analyze the sub-
stance and application of this statute, then, the remedy sought
under section 5 (1) does not have a legal common-law counterpart,
contrary to the opinion of the majority in Williams.
By encouraging a court to dissect an action for statutory pen-
alties and probe beneath the classification of the statute to its
substance and application, Ross can check the tendency of legisla-
tures to disguise legal issues with equitable nomenclature. But
a court relying on premerger custom and the remedy sought can-
not actually expand the right to a jury trial beyond that provided
under the common law, regardless of the punitive nature of an
action. Under traditional classification approaches, the court
may expand the right only by manipulating the designation of
a penalty to correspond with a common-law analogue. Although
this approach does not appear harmful when courts harbor a pro-
jury bias, the power to so manipulate constitutional results could
jeopardize a defendant's right under the seventh amendment if
exercised by a court skeptical of juries. By applying the third
Ross factor-the practical abilities and limitations of juries-to
expand rather than qualify the rights recognized in the applica-
tion of the first two factors, courts can escape the restrictions
inherited from common-law judges. But since the "practical
126. The dissenting opinion agreed with this interpretation of the in-junctive powers under section 5 (l):
There is some indication that Congress viewed § 45 () proceed-
ings as essentially equitable by importing into those proceedings
the power to issue mandatory injunctive relief "and further equi-
table relief," this power to be exercised by the district courts. Of
course, such relief could previously be granted by the court of
appeals granting enforcement of the cease and desist order,
so we must assume that Congress had some reason to lodge this
same power in the district courts in § 45 (1) proceedings.
498 F.2d at 440 n.1. Judge Oakes appears to have overlooked the possi-
bility that the same statute might provide both legal and equitable relief.
127. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
128. See note 103 supra.
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abilities and limitations of juries" are criteria also susceptible to
manipulation, the following section evaluates this third Ross
factor not only as a possible source of seventh amendment rights,
but also as a source of objective standards to ensure uniform
application of the right to a jury trial.
IV. THE PRACTICAL ABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
JURIES: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
The issue approach of Ross not only provides courts with
the power to evaluate the resemblance of legal rights and reme-
dies raised by a statutory action to those existing under the com-
mon law, regardless of the congressional designation of the over-
all action, but also appears to allow courts to recognize seventh
amendment rights without finding a legal common-law counter-
part if a jury is capable of resolving issues that would arise in
such an action. This expansion of the right to a civil jury trial
beyond the limits of the common law was recently affirmed in
Curtis v. Loether,12 9 where the Supreme Court insisted that
courts give broad scope to the seventh amendment in modern
statutory actions.130 Emphasis by the Court on "issues" rather
than on the overall action also indicates that the "practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries" may be a useful means to decide,
assuming a right to jury trial, which issues should go to the jury
and which should be preserved for the court. Consequently, the
third factor set forth by the Supreme Court in Ross has two
potential functions: as an independent constitutional "source"
of seventh amendment rights, and as a means to limit the use of
juries once this right is recognized. In fulfilling the latter
function, the factor provides the flexibility courts need to rec-
oncile effective enforcement with fairness to the defendant,
regardless of whether the seventh amendment rights are recog-
nized under the traditional test or only under the broad mandate
announced by the Curtis Court.
A. A FUNcTIoNAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
UNDER SEcTioN 5 ()
In Curtis, the Court favored broad recognition of seventh
amendment rights generally, but affirmed the denial of a civil
jury in administrative proceedings for an NLRB backpay
award.131 The Court stated that there was a "functional justifi-
129. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
130. Id. at 193.
131. Id. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
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cation" for denying seventh amendment rights in cases where
a jury would substantially interfere with the agency's role in
a statutory scheme.132 The Williams majority distinguished pro-
ceedings for NLRB awards, holding that there was no "functional
justification" for denial of jury rights in a section 5() action
when the district court rather than the agency is assigned adjudi-
cative responsibility.133 Citing the district court opinion in
United States v. Hindman,'34 Judge Friendly held that juries in
such cases were compatible with the agency's power to regulate.
Judge Oakes cited the contrary authority of the Hindman court's
own court of appeals.135 In a footnote to United States v. Vul-
canized Rubber & Plastics Co.,136 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit criticized leaving the question of violation of an
FTC order to the jury:
[C]reating an issue of fact as the court did in Hindman, would
usurp the function exclusively vested by Congress in the Federal
Trade Commission to determine the issue of whether a labeling
practice is misleading or deceptive to the public.137
1 (1937). Responding to the defendant's objection to nonjury proceed-
ings, the Court in Jones & Laughlin said:
The Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform.
There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The Board must
receive evidence and make findings. The findings of the facts
are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The or-
der of the Board is subject to review by the designated court,
and only when sustained by the court may the order be enforced.
•... We construe the procedural provisions as affording ade-
quate opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary
action in accordance with the well-settled rules applicable to ad-
ministrative agencies.
Id. at 47. The proceeding for review, unlike the enforcement action, is
not a civil action but is comparable to that offered the defendant under
15 U.S.C. § 5 (c) (1970) prior to finalization of an order.
132. 415 U.S. at 195.
133. 498 F.2d at 424. Judge Friendly, for the majority, stated:
What is decisive is that with that avenue [granting plenary au-
thority to the agency] known to be open, and with the Supreme
Court having just sustained the provision in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 authorizing the NLRB to award back pay,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937),
Congress in enacting Section 5 (l) took a course that had been
uniformly held to entail a right to jury trial ....
Id. at 430. Cf. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1375 (a)
(Supp. II, 1972); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(i)(1970); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1678 (1970). The
attempt in the dissenting opinion to analogize rights accorded by Con-
gress to defendants under the NLRA to those available under section
5(l) seems erroneous. See 498 F.2d at 452-53.
134. 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960).
135. 498 F.2d at 450, citing United States v. Vulcanized Rubber &
Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
136. 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
137. Id. at 258-59 n.2. Another criticism of Hindman in the Vul-
canized opinion was that "the sole issue before the court [in Hindman]
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Although Judge Friendly agreed that this criticism was "against"
the Hindman court's holding that a defendant in a section 5(l)
proceeding was entitled to a jury trial,138 the statement actually
went no further than to question whether the particular issues
before the Hindman court were appropriate for jury decision, as-
suming a seventh amendment right. The Vulcanized court was
only apprehensive that a jury might disturb the factual findings
of the FTC that supported the order; it did not appear to deny
the right to jury trial altogether. Since the Vulcanized court
sustained a lower court's summary judgment,139 there was no
further indication that this criticism was intended to deny a de-
fendant's right to a jury trial on all disputed questions of fact.
The Williams majority also read Vulcanized as suggesting
that the FTC had exclusive authority to adjudicate violations or
to finally determine what conduct was prohibited by the order.
Denying this proposition, Judge Friendly clearly indicated
that the agency's role in enforcement actions was prosecutorial
rather than adjudicative.' 4 The Vulcanized court, however,
seems not to have been concerned with expanding the Commis-
sion's role in enforcement proceedings, but only with preserving
the Commission's freedom to determine, on the basis of adminis-
trative proceedings, what conduct it should proscribe to prevent
injury to consumers and competitors from unfair and deceptive
trade practices. According to this view, a jury might restrict
the scope of the original FTC order, thereby retroactively inter-
fering with the Commission's administrative decision, since juries
are not required to apply orders in light of the intent and purpose
of the agency as the court must if it retains the question of viola-
tion as a matter of "law."' 41 Consequently, a jury trial, as Vul-
was whether or not the labeling practice was within the proscription of
the order and not whether the labeling practice was deceptive." Id. To
this, the Williams majority aptly responded: "The district judge in
Hindman fully agreed that the only issue before him was whether the
order covered the practice in question; as to that issue he held that there
was a triable factual dispute." 498 F.2d at 422.
138. 498 F.2d at 422.
139. 288 F.2d at 260.
140. 498 F.2d at 422.
141. The determination of an issue by the FTC is res judicata insofar
as other branches of the United States government are concerned. See
United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 142-43 (7th Cir.
1944). Courts have derived this rule from section 5 (g) of the FTC Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1970), which defines the procedure by which admin-
istrative orders are made final. Moreover, section 5(d), 15 U.S.C. §
45(d) (1970), provides that the "jurisdiction of the court of appeals of
the United States to affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside orders ... shall
be exclusive." Since the court reviewing a cease and desist order has
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canized and the Williams dissenting opinion suggested, might be
functionally incompatible with effective regulation where the
jury is asked to decide questions of violation, or to apply law
to fact. Such "mixed" questions, however, if they have not arisen
in prior agency proceedings, are not always inappropriate for lay
determination. Moreover, questions of "pure" fact, such as
whether an event did or did not occur, will never have been pre-
viously decided by the agency in enforcement actions under sec-
tion 5 (l), since such actions are brought for acts allegedly occur-
ring after the agency's cease and desist order is issued. Applica-
tion of the functional approach, therefore-measuring the com-
patibility of juries with the statutory purpose-yields a condi-
tional seventh amendment right for defendants in section 5 ()
actions, with the applicability of the right dependent upon the
type of issue before the court.
B. A FUNcTIONAL ANALYSIS OF IssuES APPROPRIATE
FOR JuRy REsoLuTIoN
Once it is determined that the jury, although limited in some
respects with regard to prior agency findings, is capable of trying
issues that arise in a section 5 (Z) action, the "practical abilities
and limitations of juries" factor may again be applied to decide
on an issue-by-issue basis which questions the defendant has a
right to submit to a lay panel. This approach contains the flexi-
bility necessary to balance the criminal nature of section 5(Z)
and the criminal defendant's right to try all issues before a jury
against the need for effective enforcement of cease and desist
orders, the foundation for which may be undermined by relitigat-
ing FTC findings. It also contains, however, in the form of the
"fact-law" distinction, the potential for de facto denial of seventh
amendment rights. Although courts have traditionally exercised
with impunity the power to distinguish "factual" from "legal"
issues, the functional approach elevates this distinction to consti-
tutional significance and thus requires standards to assure its
before it the entire record, including all evidence taken, whereas the
court enforcing the order does not, the findings supporting an order
affirmed by the former court are binding on the latter. Although the
Court has held that this comports with due process, Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), an enforcing court sensing that the defendant
has been disadvantaged in prior proceedings may want to review facts
on the original Commission record. With the potentially large liability
under section 5(1), res judicata may be a barrier to a fair enforcement
action for the respondent. See Schwartz, Administrative Law and the
Sixth Amendment: "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme," 40
A.B.A.J. 107 (1954).
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uniform application. Without standards to distinguish "legal"
from "factual" issues, courts will retain the power to manipulate
a defendant's constitutional rights by simply relabeling issues
"legal," similar to the manner in which courts could deny seventh
amendment rights by relabeling actions as "equitable" under the
modified historical test.
1. The Need to Protect the Scope of the Original Order
Allowing a lay panel to determine without deference to the
agency whether the defendant has violated a cease and desist
order shifts the responsibility for interpreting the dimensions of
the order from the FTC to the jury, thereby reducing the scope
of conduct within the Commission's effective power of regulation.
Deciding which issues are "factual," therefore, necessarily in-
volves a determination of the scope of the order, measured by
the relationship of the conduct under scrutiny to that originally
addressed by the Commission's decree. Recognizing that broad
regulatory discretion is necessary to regulate trade effectively,
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.1 42 affirmed a broadly
worded cease and desist order, but also held that the defendant
should be permitted in an enforcement action to raise all statu-
tory issues, such as the deceptiveness of its trade practices, es-
pecially where conduct allegedly in violation of the order is not
specifically proscribed. The Court reasoned that when the facts
change substantially after the issuance of the original order, so
that the general language of the order is the sole basis for estab-
lishing liability, the enforcing court must perform the agency
function of interpreting what acts Congress intended to prohibit
as "deceptive.' 1 43  In the enforcement proceeding, therefore,
where the court is called upon to make these "first instance" de-
terminations, the agency merely argues for its own interpretation
of the FTC Act.' 44 In such cases, a jury does not interfere with
142. 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
143. Id. at 475-76.
144. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941), the Su-
preme Court held that the Board's order, like the injunction of a court,
must state with reasonable specificity the acts which the respondent may
or may not do:
It would seem equally clear that the authority conferred on the
Board to restrain the practice which it has found the employer
to have committed is not an authority to restrain generally all
other unlawful practices which it has neither found to have been
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the agency's adjudicative function, since the court is performing
that function. A jury trial would duplicate agency deliberations
or impair the scope of an agency order only when the specific
language of the order clearly prohibits acts and practices previ-
ously determined to be unfair by the Commission. In such cases,
the court may grant summary judgment as a matter of "law."
Courts should leave questions of violations to the jury, therefore,
whenever the facts change substantially after the original pro-
ceedings before the FTC, and liability under section 5(1) thus
depends upon proscription of the defendant's conduct under the
general, rather than specific, language of the order. This stand-
ard permits maximum litigation of factual issues consistent with
the sixth amendment without usurping the agency's power to
proscribe conduct found in administrative proceedings to be
harmful.145
2. The Need to Defer to Agency Expertise
Even if the conduct falls within the general rather than the
specific prohibitions of the order, a court applying the Ross anal-
ysis must consider a second factor in evaluating the practical abil-
ities and limitations of the jury: the need for special expertise
to resolve questions of violation. If an issue is too complex for
jury determination, or if its resolution requires application of the
experience accumulated by the Commission in regulating an in-
dustry, a court should preserve the matter for its own judgment
in light of the intent and purposes of the agency.
In Hindman, the district court faced the question whether
a representation that the defendant's uniforms were "custom-
tailored" fell within the prohibitions of an order forbidding "cus-
tom-made" labels. The court ruled that the issue was one for
jury determination:
We must bear in mind the principle that the meaning to be given
such representations as these is not the meaning which would
be attached to them by experts, but by the average man who
145. An additional advantage of limiting the scope of agency author-
ity to the specific language of the order is that it will encourage the Com-
mission to specify more carefully what conduct it intends to regulate.
The Supreme Court, concerned with the power of the FTC to arbitrarily
regulate beyond the original decree, stated:
The severity of possible penalties prescribed by the amendments
for violations of orders which have become final underlines the
necessity for fashioning orders which are, at the outset, suffici-
ently clear and precise to avoid raising serious questions as to
their meaning and application.
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1962).
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would be likely to purchase the articles in question and to whom
these representations are made.146
Professor Jaffe concurred:
The jury was to decide whether in the opinion of purchasers the
questioned phrase meant the same thing as the proscribed one.
Who better than a lay customer to decide?147
Jaffe's characterization of a juror as a "lay customer," how-
ever, is inaccurate. A juror does not reassume the role of an
ignorant consumer once he has heard evidence regarding the ac-
tual capability of the product, but decides, in light of all the testi-
mony, whether the defendant's representations are deceptive.
The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether a jury, set apart from
"the American gullible public"'148 can evaluate the evidence
placed before it. Presumably, simple fact questions such as
whether a defendant did or did not commit certain acts can be
decided by the jury, but questions of violation that may require
interpretation of subtle shades of deceptiveness and frequent re-
liance on "inference and pragmatic judgment"'1 49 are more diffi-
cult and may be beyond lay competence. Yet the strong mandate
for a civil jury trial, even where the factual issues are complex,
suggests that few questions should be retained by the court for its
own decision. Only when factual issues arise that require evalu-
ation of voluminous or technical evidence should the court apply
prior agency findings and conclusions to the conduct in alleged
violation of a general cease and desist order.' 50 Where the jury
is incapable of understanding and drawing conclusions from a
wide range of statistical and technical data, deference should be
paid to agency findings.' 5 '
146. 179 F. Supp. at 927-28.
147. L. JAFF JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 319 n.237
(1965). The simplicity of this logic is alluring, but since not all products
are for general consumption, this restricts rather than enlarges the
lay jury's role. In Hindman, the army was the only purchaser of the uni-
forms whose labels were allegedly deceptive. To be consistent with
Jaffe's rationale for jury trial, the court should have tried the question
of violation, since the representations were not designed to influence the
general public. Only the army as "lay customers" would be capable of
evaluating the labels deceptiveness.
148. 83 CONG. REC. 394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Sirovich).
149. 498 F.2d at 446 (Oakes, J., dissenting), quoting FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
150. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). The Supreme
Court in Dairy Queen stated that few matters would be beyond jury
competence, but suggested that the courts, if necessary, could appoint
masters to assist the jury "in those exceptional cases where the legal is-
sues are too complicated for the jury adequately to handle alone ....
Id. at 478.
151. Another example of superior agency expertise occurs where in-
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C. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS TO Williams
A functional analysis thus suggests two standards to guide
courts in reconciling effective regulation with fairness to the de-
fendant in the selection of jury issues. Under these standards,15 2
(1) if the conduct is not specifically proscribed by the original
order but falls only within general prohibitions, and (2) if the
question is not so technical as to require resolution in light of
the intent and purpose of the agency, then the jury must decide
the question.
In Williams, the first issue-whether the defendants misrep-
resented Geritol's ability to build "iron power" in "iron poor
blood"--was correctly remanded for jury trial, since the repre-
sentations were not alleged to state directly, but only "by impli-
cation that [this preparation could relieve] tiredness, loss of
strength, run-down feeling, nervousness or irritability .. .
The phrase "by implication" in the cease and desist order is a
general prohibition, and no special expertise is required to decide
whether building "iron power" exaggerates Geritol's limited abil-
ity to remedy iron deficiency or iron deficiency anemia.
1 54
The court was also correct in remanding for jury trial the
issue whether the "sad-glad" commercials violated the cease and
desist order. This format, depicting a consumer at the beginning
of the commercial as generally unhappy and at the end of the
commercial as in higher spirits,155 is widely used by the advertis-
numerable variations of the same conduct are possible, and specific pro-
scription is not practical. For example, if an advertiser avoids the spe-
cific language of the order by simply changing his advertising copy, def-
erence to the intent and purposes of the agency is appropriate because
of its ability to adjudicate substantially similar cases "expeditiously" by
giving effect to its accumulated experience in evaluating the deceptive
effects of representations in a slightly altered context.
152. Professor Davis commented that the avoidance of overregula-
tion should not be accomplished at the expense of administrative effec-
tiveness: "[Ojur objective should be to find ways and means of maing
the administrative process at one and the same time both effective and
fair." Davis, Ombudsman in America: Officers To Criticize Adminis-
trative Action, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1057, 1062 (1961).
153. 498 F.2d at 418 n.2. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
154. "By implication," "substantially similar properties," "similar
conduct," and other like phrase$ all reflect attempts to regulate beyond
the scope of conduct actually found in administrative proceedings to be
in violation of the FTC Act.
155. 354 F. Supp. at 539-41.
Her smile may convey to viewers her happiness that she no
longer has iron-poor blood, but it definitely conveys something
else as well. It shows her in good spirits and makes her look
stronger and healthier. The implication is that she was sad not
simply because she had iron-poor blood, but because she was
19751
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ing industry'5 6 to convey the impression that a consumer's life
will be improved by the use of a product. The sad-glad format
represented only by implication that Geritol was "beneficial in
the treatment or relief of tiredness,"' 57 and consequently these
commercials did not fall within the specific prohibitions of the
order. Nevertheless, the Williams majority may have over-
looked the complexity of this question of violation by suggesting
that "tiredness" was a word of common meaning and that a jury
could decide better than a court whether a commercial conveyed
the proscribed impression. The word "tiredness" as originally
applied in the 1965 cease and desist order was intended to pro-
hibit representations that Geritol was an effective remedy for
"tiredness, loss of strength, [or a] run-down feeling."'u s Argu-
ably, the sad-glad format, which suggests that consumption of
a product yields emotional dividends, does not cause the same
harm that the original order, applied to "tired blood" commer-
cials, sought to prevent. Merely because the product advertised
is a vitamin supplement consumed to improve physical health,
it does not follow that a format suggesting 'an improved outlook
from use of the product should be penalized. Though tiredness
was, to the Williams court, a word with a static meaning, the
alteration of the factual context to which the order applied may
have substantially changed its effect. Methods of competition
that would be unfair under certain circumstances may be entirely
unobjectionable under different circumstances.' 9 Discernment
of the subtle shadings and nuances that the order may have ac-
quired over the course of negotiations between the agency and
the respondent may indeed require expertise. When such ex-
pertise is required to make a fair determination of a factual issue,
however, the court should not be limited to allowing a common
definition to control the jury's decision, nor should it necessarily
remove the question from the jury altogether. By alerting the
jury to possible shades of meaning that may have evolved during
the course of pre-enforcement proceedings, the court may pre-
serve the scope of the original order without denying the de-
fendant the right to jury trial. Only when the term is incapable
feeling run-down as a result of that fact. Now she is smiling
not simply because she has iron rich blood, but because she feels
better as a consequence. Thanks to Geritol.
Id. at 540.
156. See note 37 supra.
157. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
158. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
159. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
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of further clarification should the court allow the common defini-
tion to control the jury determination. 60
The court was incorrect, however, in failing to remand the
issue of whether the FernIron commercials violated the cease and
desist order. The Williams majority held that this product was
included in the order, and that the commercials failed to dis-
close adequately that iron deficiency anemia was not present in
most women.16' FemIron, however, was not specifically pro-
scribed by the original order. The defendants argued that this
product was of only "supplemental" value while Geritol was
"therapeutic," and that since FemIron was not intended to treat
the syndrome for which Geritol was formulated, the products
were not "substantially similar."'162 Moreover, the commercials
only suggested "by implication" that FemIron was a general rem-
edy for tiredness. With a claim that "some women risk becoming
anemic and tired"'6 3 because of insufficient iron reserves, fol-
lowed by a suggestion to take FemIron to prevent iron shortages,
the commercials only implied that this product relieved tiredness.
These two factual issues-whether the commercials represented
that FemIron was an effective general remedy for iron deficiency
anemia, and, if so, whether the commercials adequately disclosed
that most women do not suffer from this disease-required only
that the jury evaluate the meaning of the commercials, and not
FemIron's remedial potential. Neither question, therefore, re-
quired expert judgment and, under the proposed standards,
should have been remanded to the district court for a jury trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's shift in Ross v. Bernhard from the tra-
ditional historical and modified historical tests to an "issue" ap-
proach may provide an important source of seventh amendment
rights for defendants in statutory proceedings that have no re-
semblance to "legal" actions under the common law. Even under
the issue approach that permits courts to dissect statutory
schemes into their component rights and remedies, however,
some modern statutory actions may not have common-law coun-
terparts, thus forcing courts disposed toward granting civil jury
rights either to artificially manipulate the classification of an ac-
160. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HAnv. L. REv. 899,
905 (1943).
161. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See also text accom-
panying note 38 supra.
162. 498 F.2d at 431.
163. Id. at 434.
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tion or to pursue the functional approach embodied in the third
Ross factor, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. The
advantage of adopting this approach is that courts may avoid
the search for legal common-law counterparts supporting a right
to jury trial, and follow the pro-jury mandate of Curtis to expand
civil jury rights if a jury is functionally compatible with the pur-
poses of the statute. The functional analysis also appears to
work well as a means of separating court from jury issues to
check arbitrary de facto denials of seventh amendment rights.
By elevating the fact-law distinction to constitutional impor-
tance, preservation of the civil jury right assumes a significance
comparable to the agency's interest in deciding what conduct vio-
lates the FTC Act. An important byproduct of the functional
analysis is its ability to accommodate the sixth amendment policy
favoring the litigation of all material issues before laymen, while
maintaining the power of courts to withdraw issues previously
decided by the agency. Uniform adherence to the standards in-
spired by the Ross analysis will promote liberal recognition of
the right to a civil jury trial without invasion of the Commis-
sion's regulatory authority.
